Analysis, championed the use of mathematics in economics. He was hardly the first economist to use math, but he showed how math could be systematically employed to reformulate familiar and unfamiliar economic arguments. He was like Adam Smith, organizing various strands of existing economics into a new coherent synthesis.
The economics department started its graduate program after the war. The education was constructed like a three-legged stool, resting on required courses in economic theory, econometrics, and economic history. But while the legs of a stable stool are equal, these required courses were not. Economic theory and measurement were in their ascendancy, and economic history needed to find a way to coexist with the new theories and econometrics to survive.
This problem can be seen more clearly by another analogy: Marxian class struggles.
Marx identified three classes that can be associated with the legs of MIT's three-legged stool.
Aristocrats (landowners) are economic historians; capitalists (owners of capital) are theorists, and proletarians (owners of labor) are econometricians. Economic historians were being supplanted in economics as the aristocracy was in Europe after the Industrial Revolution. The question for power then was who the econometricians would support. One the one hand, like economic historians, they regarded facts and data as primary inputs to their work. Dewey had helped form both the AEA and ASA. On the other hand, econometricians also were interested in new statistical and econometric theories. In the early years of the MIT economics department, they went with the theorists. The relationship between economics and economic history had changed dramatically from Dewey, who was a leader of both, to Rostow, who was marginal to economists. Economics in this interval became a mathematical social science under the leadership of Paul Samuelson.
MIT was at the forefront of this process, and it became the leading proponent of mathematical growth theory under the leadership of Robert Solow in the 1960s. Solow's seminal work was published while Rostow was at MIT, but Rostow by then was moving into politics. criticism and opposition to the war were beginning to crystallize, and he eventually served the purpose of shielding the president from criticism and from reality (Halberstam, 1972) ." He was not invited back to MIT when he completed his government service.
One effect of the change in the focus of economics was to change the main mode of reasoning from inductive to deductive. This meant that papers in economics changed from being primarily narrative like Dewey's papers and started with a model like Samuelson's papers. The new economics papers progressed from a model to data and then hypothesis tests. Dewey (1903) and Taussig (1910) while I was a student. As I started teaching, they were supplanted by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) . I wrote my first book on the Great Depression in response to their views (Temin, 1976) .
Economic history at MIT expanded in the 1970s as two economists already at MIT turned to economic history late in their careers and taught economic history during the years before they retired. They were Charles Kindleberger and Evsey Domar. Kindleberger had been involved with the war effort like Rostow and other members of the early department. He wrote prolifically about his experiences and turned to teaching and writing in economic history toward the end of his career. He wrote two books in the 1970s that have become classics. The first was the fourth volume in a series on the history of the world economy in the twentieth century, and it is safe to say that the series is remembered because of Kindleberger's book rather than the other way around. He championed an international view of the Great Depression and introduced the idea of an international hegemon, that is, a country that can lead the world economy to prosperity. Both ideas have had wide currency. The second was a more popular survey entitled, Manias, Crashes and Panics. The two books appeared in 1973 and 1978 initially; the first had a second edition in 1986, and the second had many revisions, the latest in 1996 (Kindleberger, 1973 (Kindleberger, , 1978 .
Kindleberger made several points in his books. One important point of the first book was that the Great Depression was global, caused in part by the collapse of international raw-material cartels and the dramatic fall in trade. Another point was that the Depression took place in an interregnum when Britain had lost the ability to be hegemon, largely by expending so many 8 resources on the First World War and partly from the decay of its comparative advantage before the war. The United States, which might have been expected to become the new hegemon, was not yet ready to take on that role; only after the Second World War did the United States step forward as an international hegemon. In the second book, Kindleberger asserted that booms and busts are to be expected, not necessarily on the scale of the Great Depression, but still with enough force to disturb the progress of economic growth. Domar was less prolific, but he left economic historians with the "Domar model": a trilemma that said you could not simultaneously have free land, free labor, and an aristocracy (Domar, 1970) . This trilemma can be seen as an adaptation of the Marxian class struggle.
Instead of foreseeing a winning combination of two out of three classes, Domar asserted only a combination of two out of three conditions he listed could exist in a world without capital. The idea of a trilemma has been used widely, and it has migrated into international economics to reveal that you can only have two of fixed exchange rates, free capital movements, and an independent monetary policy (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004) . The trilemma was illustrated tragically in 1931 when Weimar Germany abandoned free capital movements, Britain abandoned fixed exchange rates, and monetary policy in the United States was dedicated to preserving the exchange rate. The resulting deflationary pressure sent the world into the Great Depression (Temin, 1989 ). This trilemma is highly relevant today since the European Monetary Union created a fixed exchange rate between its members and encouraged the free movement of capital. The result was that the member countries no longer had monetary policies. In the difficult economic 9 times that followed the Global Financial Crisis, members of the EMU have had to rely on fiscal policy alone to make needed adjustments. It is proving a hard road to travel. Rico soon after I returned, during which he persuaded me to teach world economic history. It seemed like a major challenge after teaching American economic history for twenty years, although it proved to be a great stimulus to my teaching and research. I published my second book on the Great Depression in 1989, building on Kindleberger's international approach in the Robbins Lectures at the LSE (Temin, 1989) .
I became head of the economics department in 1990. We had made appointments during the 1980s to replace Samuelson-many times-and the other retirees from the postwar cohort that built our department, but we had gotten out of the habit of hiring fresh PhDs. It was a problem of asymmetric information. We were happy to hire older scholars, but we seemed to need more information about younger ones. I launched a campaign to get us to hire freshly minted scholars, and found that it took some years before we relearned how to accomplish this task well. We made some bad choices in the first few years, and then had the opportunity to make a big score in 1993. There were many excellent students on the market that year, and we had the budget to hire several of them.
I decided to push our budget and hire a total of six new assistant professors, including Daron Acemoglu from the LSE and Dora Costa from Chicago. Acemoglu was very bright, but we were not sure what field he would fit into, while Costa was sharply focused on economic history. Hiring six junior faculty members in one year scared Philip Khoury, the dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, and Jim Poterba and I had to calm him down over lunch one day in the spring of 1993.
That year also was busy among senior members of the MIT economics department when
Harvard made offers to many of our senior people. Olivier Blanchard (macro) stayed at MIT, but we lost Oliver Hart and Drew Fudenberg (theorists) to Harvard. To counter this onslaught I hired Abhijit Banerjee from Harvard, a junior theorist with an interest in economic development, and started the process that brought Bengt Holmstrom (theory) to MIT the following year.
Banerjee was one of the six junior hires in 1993.
The new junior faculty members were a good group, but Acemoglu and Costa were the only ones of the new PhDs who remained in the department, earned tenure and took their place as senior members of the department. Acemoglu continued to work and publish in many fields of economics, and he rapidly emerged as a department leader with his broad interests and abilities. Costa proved to be an excellent scholar who published in leading economics journals as well as those in economic history and demography, but she remained at the edge of the department as an economic historian despite her prize-winning book on the evolution of retirement in America (Costa, 1998) .
It is probably not fair to either Acemoglu or Costa to use them as examples of trends, but
it is instructive to see their development as instructive in chronicling the fate of economic history at MIT. I generalize the argument with two slim volumes in the Oxford University Press series of Very Short Introductions, one on economics and one on economic history (Dasgupta, 2007; Allen, 2011) . Both books start by contrasting rich and poor nations, saying that explaining this difference is the topic of their brief books. Dasgupta starts by contrasting conditions of two ten year old girls, one in America and one in Ethiopia. He goes from there to contrasting rich and poor nations. Allen starts with the great divergence of incomes started by the Industrial Revolution. He goes from there to contrasting rich and poor nations. From similar beginnings, the two brief books go in different directions. Dasgupta explores differences in trust in the extremes of incomes, while Allen emphasizes the historical paths by which countries arrived to 12 their present positions. They however both end on the same note, as shown by their final sentences. For economics: "There is, alas, no magic potion for bringing about economic progress in either world (Dasgupta, 2007, p. 160) ." For economic history: "The best policy to effect economic development, therefore, remains very much in dispute (Allen, 2011, p. 147) ."
The two books are quite compatible. Neither claims to have a good answer for the question posed at the beginning. But only one of them is considered central to economics. In terms of the class struggle described earlier, the coalition of theory and econometrics left economic history out of power in the counsels of economics. Proponents of the New Economic History were using more and more econometrics in their work, but they were no match for theorists. This is a loss to the department because economic history, even in Allen's short volume, adds to our understanding of economic growth in several ways. Most importantly, economic history contains a sense of time. Economic growth since the Industrial Revolution has continued over a long time, and the gaps we see today are the result of two centuries of varied experiences.
In addition, politics and economics are intertwined in the economic history. Nations make choices, even if only by default, and these choices affect growth. Demography and resources affect economic growth, but they do not determine it. And the study of history can expand the insights of formal economics, which provides detailed understanding of specific processes, into a narrative of people and choices. In particular, although not in this small volume, it can acknowledge that history is not always monotonic. Costa and I taught American and European economic history together for almost twenty years. She also taught econometrics, and I also taught macro, but we only taught undergraduates and were consumers rather than producers to these fields. Costa regularly published many papers and books in both economics and related journals. New graduates of other departments in economic history during these years lacked the technical skills she showed and were not considered by MIT. We did not have many graduate students in economic history, but several students rewrote and published their term papers (Frankel, 1982; Johnson and Temin, 1993; Head, 1994; Slaughter, 2001; Cole, 2005) .
The economic history paper was one of the legs of the three-legged stool supporting the economics department. The paper requirement began many years earlier when most field courses had term papers. It was by the turn of the century only a remnant of this pedagogical approach to graduate studies. The economic-history paper in the first year joined with the econometrics paper in the second year to help guide graduate students through the abrupt change from courses to thesis writing in the third year. We lack a test of the usefulness of these requirements as we have neither random assignment nor a good measure of output for such a 14 test. I remain convinced of the usefulness of having students write papers throughout their education despite the absence of a rigorous test.
Then, in rapid succession, Costa moved to California, I retired, and the MIT economics department abandoned the graduate requirement of a course in economic history late in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The three-legged stool had collapsed. In terms of class conflict, the new had completely vanquished the old. Theory and econometrics joined to eliminate economic history as the capitalists and workers joined earlier to exile aristocrats. The economic-history paper vanished.
What is the cost of not having economic history at MIT? It can be seen in Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail (2012) . This is a deservedly successful popular book, making a simple and strong point that the authors made originally at the professional level over a decade before (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) . They assert that countries can be "ruled by a narrow elite that have [sic] organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass of people" or can have "a revolution that transformed the politics and thus the economics of the nation … to expand their economic opportunities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, pp. 3-4) ."
The book is not however good economic history. It is an example of Whig history in which good policies make for progress and bad policies preclude it. Only transitions from bad to good are considered in this colorful but still monotonic story. The clear implication is that if countries can copy the policies of English-speaking countries, they will prosper. No consideration is given to Britain's economic problems over the past half-century or of Australia's relative decline for a century.
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The book takes a shotgun approach to economic history, and many of the pellets go astray. In the areas I know about, their interpretations are out of date and misleading. For example, they quote research into the records of Hoare's Bank to illustrate that "loans would be available to all" as a result of Parliament's reform of finance after the Glorious Revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 195) . This inference has two problems. It was taken from a paper by me and Hans-Joachim Voth about the microeconomics of what we called goldsmith banking (Temin and Voth, 2008) . But Acemoglu and Robinson ignored our earlier paper that used the records of Hoare's Bank to explore the macroeconomics of British economic growth (Temin and Voth, 2005 ). There we showed that financial changes in the early eighteenth century retarded the growth of incomes during the Industrial Revolution. In addition, goldsmith banks originated before the revolution noted by Acemoglu and Robinson. Their growth-like the country's growth a century later-was shackled by Parliament's financial actions after the Glorious Revolution.
Acemoglu and Robinson also pluck low-hanging fruit in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
They discuss China briefly in their discussion of current events, but they ignore the gorilla on the basketball court: the United States (Kahneman, 2011) Acemoglu has raised this question in interviews about the book, but the book itself presents a picture of an Olympian America looking down on a multitude of failed states.
The United States is not the only advanced country in trouble at the moment. These countries typically are not becoming failed states in the Acemoglu and Robinson sense; they have adopted policies they should have recognized from the inter-war years and avoided. This is recounted in my third book on the Great Depression, this time with explicit lessons for today (Temin and Vines, 2013) . When I taught the Great Depression at MIT, students asked me whether there could be another one. I replied that there would always be recessions and even possibly another depression, but I said it would not be like the Great Depression-because policy makers had learned to avoid the mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s.
Ben Bernanke appeared to agree as he commented to Milton Friedman, at a ceremonial dinner to honor Friedman in his ninetieth birthday, that the Fed would not make the same mistakes again in a clear reference to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) . Despite some sanity from Bernanke and another MIT graduate, Paul Krugman, the United States is joining Britain in selfinflicted austerity. The countries of southern Europe are deflating in response to pressures to save the euro. The resulting strains on the fabric of society led to political problems in the immediate aftermath of the First World War and again in the early 1930s. Economic history would help policy makers today if we recalled it to them, as no one wants to see democratic governments in trouble or the rise of something like fascism in Southern Europe.
Let me close on a more positive note. Acemoglu plays a role in this positive ending, as this protean scholar has affected many things at MIT. Two of Acemoglu's recent students show how economic history might progress to rejoin economics more fully. Richard Hornbeck is now an Assistant Professor at Harvard, and Melissa Dell is a Junior Fellow at Harvard. They both are competent econometricians, and their research is based on the idea of natural experiments. In both cases, Hornbeck about the United States and Dell about Latin America, they find temporal and geographic boundaries where they can test the effects of various exogenous events. Some of these effects have proved highly durable and therefore important to economic history. Their papers are now appearing in prestigious economics journals. I hope that they will continue to do well and that the economics department will invite one or both of them back at some time to
